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Wainwright: Immigration Law

IMMIGRATION LAW

SUMMARY

PRICE v. INS: REQUIRING RESIDENT
ALIEN SEEKING CITIZENSHIP TO
LIST ALL MEMBERSHIPS AND
AFFILIATIONS DOES NOT
VIOLATE FIRST AMENDMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service,! the Ninth Circuit held that the United States Attorney
General did not exceed his statutory authority by requiring a
resident alien petitioning for naturalization to state past and
present memberships in any and all organizations. 2 The court
concluded that the exercise of this authority did not violate petitioner's First Amendment right of association because a resident alien's constitutional protection may be limited3 and
invoke only narrow judicial review. 4
II.

FACTS

John Eric Price is a resident alien who petitioned for naturalization in 1984. 6 Question 18 on the application to petition
1. 941 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (per Beezer, J.; the other panel members were
Singleton, J., United States District Judge for the District of Alaska sitting by designation, and Noonan, J., dissenting).
2. [d. at 882.
3. [d.
4. [d. at 884.

5. Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 941 F.2d 878,
879 (9th Cir. 1991). Appellant John Eric Price is a United Kingdom national who has
lived and worked in this country since he was granted lawful resident alien status in
1960. Price at 879.
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asked Mr. Price to list his memberships in any and all organizations. 6 Mr. Price completed the entire application with
the exception of Question 18, which he responded to with a legal
brief contending that the question violated his First
Amendment right to freedom of association. 7
When read the text of Question 18 at the Further
Preliminary Hearing, Price told the examiner that he had no
foreign military experience, that he had been a member of an
organization, and that he refused to answer further questions
regarding his association with any group on the grounds that
the questions were both "overbroad" and violative of his First
Amendment rights. s At this hearing and at an earlier hearing,
as well as on the application to petition for naturalization, Price
swore under oath that he had never been a communist, nor had
he ever in any manner advocated, taught, or supported communism. 9 Price also swore that he had never been a member or
affiliate of any organization in which membership or participation would automatically preclude an alien from
naturalization. 10
6. Question 18 reads: "List your present and past memberships in or affiliation
with every organization, association, fund, foundation, party, club, society or similar
group in the United States or in any other country or place, and your foreign military
service. (If none, write 'None.')." Price at 879.
7.Id.
8. Id. Price refused to answer the following questions: "Are you now or have
you ever been a member, or are you now affiliated, or have your ever been affiliated with any organization, association, fund, foundation, party, club, society or similar group in the United States or in any other country or place?"; "Are you now, or
have you ever been, in the United States, a member of any organization in the
United States?"; "Have you been a member of any organizations outside the United
States?"; "Have you ever been a member of a political organization in the United
States?"; "Were you ever a member, outside of the United States, of any organization
that ... is or was political?; Are you now or have you ever been a member of any association, fund, foundation, party, club, society or any similar groups?"; and "Have you
ever been affiliated with any organization, political or nonpolitical, in the United
States?". Id. at 879, n.lo
9. Price at 879. On the application to petition Price denied ever being a member of the Communist Party, or endorsing the interests of communism. Id. During
a preliminary examination before an immigration officer Price avowed that he had
never been a member of any organization proscribed by the Immigration and
Nationality Act, nor had he engaged in any acts therein prohibited. Id. At a
Further Preliminary Examination, Price again swore under oath that he had never
been a member of the Communist Party or an advocate or supporter of its aims and
goals. Id. at 879-80.
10. Price at 880. Mr. Price was given 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (1988) which explains
that no person shall be naturalized who is a member of, or is in some way affiliated
with, any organization which advocates or publishes material advocating anarchism,
communism, totalitarianism, or the violent overthrow of the United States government.
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Based on Price's refusal to answer Question 18, the district
court denied the petition for naturalization on the recommendation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(lNS).l1 Price appealed on the grounds that the Attorney
General does not have the statutory authority to ask Question
18, and that Question 18 violates the petitioner's First
Amendment right to freedom of association. 12
III.
A.

COURT'S ANALYSIS
MAJORITY

The Ninth Circuit first considered whether Question 18
exceeded the authority granted to the Attorney General by
Congress to implement the naturalization statutes. 13 The court
then considered whether exercise of that authority unconstitutionally violated petitioner's right to freedom of association. 14
1.

Statutory authority to demand membership list

The court found that Congress authorized the Attorney
General to establish the breadth and depth of the examination
into a petitioner's eligibility for citizenship.16 The scope and
intensity of the investigation, however, must be limited to the
applicant's "residence, physical presence in the United States,
good moral character ... and other qualifications to become a naturalized citizen as required by law. "16 Within these set limits, the
court determined that the Attorney General is granted broad
power to make inquiries provided the inquiries are relevant to
the naturalization requirements established by Congress. 17
Having established that the Attorney General has broad
statutory authority to make inquiries of prospective citizens,
Price at 880.
[d.
Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 941 F.2d 878,
Cir. 1991).
14. [d. at 882-85.
15. [d. at 881. The court cited 8 U.S.C. § 1443(a), which both grants this
authority and establishes its limits.
16. Price, 941 F.2d at 881.
17. Price, 941 F.2d at 881. The court cites 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) which grants the
Attorney General authority to require a naturalization applicant to attest to "all facts
which in the opinion of the Attorney General may be material to the applicant's naturalization." Price, 941 F.2d at 881.
11.
12.
13.
881 (9th
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the Ninth Circuit gave three reasons why the Attorney General
did not exceed this broad authority when demanding a list of
organizations of which Price was a member or affiliate. IS
First, although Price contended that the § 1424(a) list
given to him at the Further Preliminary Hearing was intended to be an exhaustive list of the proscribed organizations,19 the
court found no legislative history to support petitioner's position. 20 The court agreed with the INS that only by examining
all organizations in which a petitioner was ever a member
could the Attorney General determine whether a petitioner had
been a member of a proscribed organization. 21
Second, the court stated that the INS is entitled to know of
any facts bearing on the petitioner's eligibility for citizenship.22 The court considered it "completely reasonable to assume
knowing the organizations with which a petitioner is associated
will be relevant to one or more of the requirements of
citizenship. "23
Third, the court noted that INS decisions frequently implicate questions of foreign relations. 24 Therefore, the judicial
deference to agency decisions in administrative contexts applies
with particular force to the INS.26
18. Price, 941 F.2d at 881·82.
19. 1d. at 881. See supra note 10. The list includes organizations such as the
Communist Party of the United States and the Communist Political Association.
1d. at 880.
20. Price, 941 F.2d at 881.
21. 1d. at 881. The INS' position was that if a petitioner was unaware that an
organization was a communist front, or wrongly believed that an organization was not
the type prohibited under § 1424(a), petitioner would not list that organization in
response to an eligibility inquiry. 1d. This, in turn, would leave the INS dependent
on a petitioner's own determinations whether an organization was of the prohibited
type.1d.
22. 1d. at 882. See also Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U.S. 630 (1967).
The petitioner in this case was denied naturalization on the grounds that he was not
a person of "good moral character- because he testified falsely in the preliminary naturalization proceedings when questioned regarding membership in the Hungarian
Communist Party. 1d. at 637. Further, "the Government is entitled to know of any facts
that may bear on an applicant's statutory eligibility for citizenship." 1d. at 638.
23. Price, 941 F.2d at 882.
24.1d.
25. 1d. See also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988). The Supreme Court affirmed
the Board ofImmigration Appeal's denial of a motion to reopen deportation hearings,
partially on grounds of deference to INS officials' sensitive political functions. Abudu
at 110.
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Resident alien's constitutional right of association

The court began its analysis by noting that aliens seeking
admission to the United States for the first time have no constitutional rights. 26 The court then observed that once an alien
enters the country and develops ties and connections, his constitutional protections change. 27 However, the court went on to
state that the constitutional protection afforded resident aliens
may be limited.26 The court finished its initial observations by
declaring that "the Court has historically afforded Congress
great deference in the area of immigration and naturalization. "29
The Ninth Circuit refused to apply strict scrutiny to the
Attorney General's exercise of his authority to require petitioner to list all memberships.so Although the petitioner's right
of freedom of association was implicated, this did not demand
extension of the court's scrutiny.31 Applying the Kleindienst v.
Mandel 32 standard, the court decided limited judicial scrutiny
26. Price, 941 F.2d at 882; The court relied on Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21
(1982) wherein the Supreme Court held that "an alien seeking initial admission to the
United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application." Landon at 32.
27. Price, 941 F.2d at 882. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (resident aliens have First Amendment rights).
28. Price, 941 F.2d at 882. The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), which held that
constitutional protections are not available for a nonresident alien. The Court stated that previous decisions granting constitutional rights and privileges to resident
aliens were "constitutional decisions of this Court expressly according differing protection to aliens than to citizens, based on our conclusion that the particular provisions in question were not intended to extend to aliens in the same degree as to
citizens." ld. at 273.
29. Price, 941 F.2d at 882. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (not for
court to test legislative decision in special preference immigration statute). See also
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). "In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable ifapplied to citizens." Mathews at 79-80.
30. Price, 941 F.2d at 883.
.
31. ld. The court relied on Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) for the
appropriate standard of review in cases involving immigration and First Amendment
matters. In Kleindienst, Ernest Mandel, a radical Marxist scholar, was denied a temporary visit visa to the United States. ld. at 759. Several United States citizens
brought suit claiming Dr. Mandel's exclusion violated their First Amendment right
to freedom to receive information and ideas. ld. at 759-60. The Supreme Court reasoned that since immigration is a Congressional policy-making area and its execution
is an executive function, the court is granted only narrow judicial review. ld. at 76970. The Court established a standard that forbids the court to look behind the exercise of an executive's decision on a facially legitimate and bona fide reason to exclude
an individual from entering the country, nor test the decision by balancing its justification against First Amendment interests. ld.
32. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 770. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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was appropriate and declined to balance the justification of the
executive's power against the petitioner's First Amendment
right because the power was exercised for a facially legitimate and bona fide reason. sa
The Ninth Circuit stated that this limited standard of
review was also appropriate because no alien has any right to
naturalization unless all statutory requirements are met. 34
Furthermore, the burden of proving compliance with all statutory requirements for naturalization rests with the resident
alien seeking citizenship.36
The Attorney General's decision that knowing the political
associations of a resident alien seeking citizenship is relevant to eligibility is facially legitimate and bona fide. 36
Therefore, under limited judicial scrutiny, the question requiring a resident alien to list his memberships does not violate the
First Amendment. 37 Failure to respond, however, is sufficient
grounds for denying the petition for naturalization. 38
B.

DISSENT

In his dissent, Judge Noonan claimed that the Attorney
General's exercise of the power to require an answer to
Question 18 was unconstitutional because it chilled Price's
right to freedom of association. 39 The dissent felt that resident
aliens receive full constitutional protection once they
33. Price, 941 F.2d at 885. The court disagreed with Price's contention that
Kleindienst did not apply because his case involved naturalization, rather than immigration. Id. at 883. The court stated that "naturalization decisions ... deserve at least
as much judicial deference as do decisions about initial admission.· Id. The court went
on to say that although Price was entitled to expect the greatest degree of constitutional protection that could be afforded to him, as a non-citizen that protection cer·
tainly could not be considered greater than that afforded to the plaintiff/appellees in
Kleindienst. Id. at 883·84.
34. Id. at 884. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (held an alien
who lied to procure admission and citizenship could be deported).
35. Price, 941 F.2d at 884. See also Berenyi, 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967). The
Supreme Court held that the burden of proof is on the applicant for naturalization "to
show his eligibility for citizenship in every respect.· Id. at 637. See also supra note 22.
36. Price, 941 F.2d at 885.
37. Id. at 884.
38. Id. at 885.
39. Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 941 F.2d 878,
885·886 (9th Cir. 1991). Judge Noonan likened the Immigration Service's treatment of resident aliens to pre·Abolition slaves in that resident aliens are "subject to
treatment as second class people in the United States." Id. at 885.
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lawfully enter and reside in the United States. 40 The dissent
concluded that because resident aliens are granted constitutional protections, the Immigration Service can only exercise
its broad statutory authority within its circumscribed constitutionallimits. 41 The dissent felt that the majority construed
this authority in such a way that it is unconstitutiona1. 42
Permitting the use of this authority to formulate questions
intended to gauge something as immeasurable as a petitioner's
character is impossible. The dissent felt the statute was unconstitutional because it both lacks rational purpose and infringes
on the right of free association. 43
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment
rights of resident aliens petitioning for naturalization will
not be balanced against the actions of an Attorney General
exercising congressionally-granted statutory authority for
'what the court considers a facially valid and bona fide reason.44
The Ninth Circuit stated that if the Supreme Court would
not balance the First Amendment interests of United States citizens against an executive decision made with a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the Ninth Circuit certainly cannot
be expected to implement greater judicial scrutiny when an
executive decision is made in regards to a resident alien. 46
This holding establishes that the First Amendment rights
of resident aliens petitioning for naturalization invoke only narrow judicial review. The practical effect of this ruling is that the
40. [d. The dissent quotes with approval Justice Murphy's concurrence in
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1946) that ·once an alien lawfully enters and resides
in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution
to all people within our borders." Id. at 161. Justice Murphy's view was later adopted by the Supreme Court in Kwong Hai Chu v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (held that
resident aliens enjoy constitutional protections).
41. Price, 941 F.2d at 886. The dissent suggests a more tailored question,
directed at petitioner's involvement in any organization dedicated to the overthrow
of the government or membership in any foreign military or intelligence
service would serve the intended purpose. [d. Use of this question would inform the
naturalization examiner of relevant information without being overly broad and
inquiring into associations with no relation to governmental concerns. [d.
42. Price at 886.
43. [d.
44. Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 941 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1991).
45. [d. at 884.
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Attorney General will be permitted to ask, and an applicant
required to answer, any question which the Attorney General
considers material to an applicant's eligibility for citizenship,
provided the court can find a facially legitimate and bona fide
reason for the question. Given the court's deference to Congress
in the area of immigration and naturalization, the Attorney
General could now conceivably ask almost any question of an
applicant, under the guise of determining an applicant's "good
moral character," without running afoul of the applicant's constitutional protections.

Stuyvesant Wainwright IV*
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